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Abstract
We study how aversion to ambiguity about the predictability of future asset
values and cash ﬂows aﬀects optimal portfolios and asset prices. We show
that optimal portfolios do not always react to new information even though
there are no information processing costs or other market frictions. Moreover,
the equilibrium price of the market portfolio does not always incorporate all
available public information that is worse than expected. This informational
ineﬃciency leads to price underreaction consistent with momentum.
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There is a vast amount of empirical research which studies the predictability
of cash ﬂows and discount rates for many asset classes around the world.1 The
economic and statistical signiﬁcance of the predictability results vary from study to
study and the strength of these results as well as the theoretical underpinnings and
interpretations are widely debated. In this paper, we study how aversion to ambiguity
about the predictability of future asset values and cash ﬂows aﬀects optimal portfolios
and equilibrium asset prices. We show that optimal portfolios do not always react to
new information and prices do not reﬂect all available information about an asset in
equilibrium. We refer to this phenomenon as information inertia.
Consider a linear regression model with a signal s˜ that predicts future excess
returns r˜e. Speciﬁcally,
r˜e = α + βs˜+ ε, β = R
σe
σs
, ε˜ ∼ N (0, σ2e(1−R2)) ,
where R denotes the correlation between r˜e and s˜.
2 Investors do not know the cor-
relation R and thus know neither the economic signiﬁcance β nor the explanatory
power R2 of the predictor s˜. We focus on predictors with strictly positive β.
Suppose investors have mean-variance preferences over excess returns and are
averse to ambiguity about the correlation R in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989). Hence, they consider a family of linear regression models described by the
interval [Ra, Rb] and evaluate the outcome of investment decisions under the regres-
sion model that yields the lowest expected utility. This “max-min” formulation of
preferences is a commonly used representation of decision-making under ambiguity
in asset markets, as discussed in Epstein and Schneider (2010).3
1For a review of this literature see Cochrane (2005) or Koijen and Nieuwerburgh (2011) and the
references therein.
2The variance of r˜e and s˜ is σ
2
e and σ
2
s , respectively.
3Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) axiomatize this max-min or multiple prior preference represen-
tation which implies behavior that is consistent with experimental evidence (Ellsberg (1961)) and
more recent portfolio choice experiments (Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2011) and Bossaerts, Ghi-
rardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010)). We consider diﬀerent representations in Section IV and
the internet appendix. For a discussion of diﬀerent preferences speciﬁcations that describe aversion
to ambiguity see Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2004), Epstein and Schneider (2010), and Hansen and
Sargent (2010b).
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We show that risky portfolios do not always react to the predictor s˜ when investors
are averse to ambiguity. Intuitively, ambiguity about the economic signiﬁcance and
the explanatory power of the predictor s˜ implies ambiguity about the conditional
Sharpe ratio of the asset. An ambiguity averse investor seeks robust decision rules
and considers the worst case scenario for the Sharpe ratio. For a long position, if the
signal is lower than expected, the worst case scenario for the expected excess return
is a high economic signiﬁcance (βb) because in this case the investor will signiﬁcantly
revise the expected value of the asset downwards. On the other hand, the worst
case scenario for the volatility is a low explanatory power (R2a) because in this case
less risk is resolved by the predictor. We show that there is a range of low signals
where neither the mean nor the volatility eﬀect on the Sharpe ratio dominates and
investors ignore the signal when choosing a long position. Hence, risky portfolios
exhibit information inertia.
The information inertia result for risky portfolios is economically sizable. For
instance, suppose ambiguity aversion is parameterized with a 99% conﬁdence interval
around an R2 of 0.09. Then 16% of predictors below their mean will not aﬀect a
long stock position if the unconditional Sharpe ratio is 0.4. This probability is 12%
and 20% when the unconditional Sharpe ratio is 0.3 and 0.5, respectively. This is the
case even though the predictor s˜ is statistically signiﬁcant (Ra > 0). In contrast, the
portfolios of standard expected utility maximizers will always respond to statistically
signiﬁcant predictors unless there are transaction costs or other costs to acquire or
process information.
We also study the eﬀects of ambiguity aversion on the equilibrium price of the
market portfolio when there is predictability about its future cash ﬂows. We show
that the price of the market portfolio fails to incorporate all available information
in equilibrium. This informational ineﬃciency has an interesting asymmetry. While
signals that convey information that is better than expected are always reﬂected in
the stock price some signals that convey information that is worse than expected are
not.
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Moreover, the reaction of the equilibrium price to information depends on the
unconditional risk premium of the market portfolio. The price of a very risky market
portfolio is more likely to underreact to signals that are worse than expected whereas
the price of a market portfolio that is less risky tends to overreact to this signal.
However, the most striking result is that a market portfolio with intermediate risk
shows no reaction to many signals that are worse than expected even though there
are no information processing costs or other market frictions. For instance, if the
unconditional risk premium is between 5% and 10%, then 20% to 39% of bad signals
are not reﬂected in the price when ambiguity aversion is parameterized with a 99%
conﬁdence interval around an R2 of 0.09.
This paper may also shed some light on the documented momentum of asset prices
in the United States and other developed countries.4 Speciﬁcally, assets that have
performed well in the past tend to continue to perform well. Most of the papers in
the literature rely on behavioral explanations for this phenomenon (e.g. Barberis,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and
Hong and Stein (1999)). We provide an explanation for momentum that is based
on investors who are averse to ambiguity. Moreover, prices underreact to good news
and the underreaction to bad news increases with the risk of the asset and ambiguity
aversion which is consistent with the ﬁndings in Zhang (2006).5
In addition, we study the eﬀects of investor heterogeneity on optimal portfolios
and asset prices when all investors receive the same signal about future cash ﬂows.
There is a range of signals for which investors’ portfolios and the price of the market
portfolio do not react to new information in equilibrium even when investors diﬀer
with respect to their aversion to risk and ambiguity. This is no longer true if there
are some investors who are ambiguity neutral because their portfolios always respond
to information. We show that in this case equilibrium portfolios and the price of the
4For a review of the literature on momentum strategies see Jegadeesh and Titman (2011),
Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012), and the reference therein.
5Kelsey, Kozhan, and Pang (2011) study the eﬀects of ambiguity aversion on the proﬁtability of
momentum strategies. In contrast to our paper, in their model prices always react to information
and there is momentum even without ambiguity averse investors.
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market portfolio do not react a lot to these signals.
We also consider two additional models of preferences that are less parsimonious
but allow for a distinction between ambiguity and ambiguity aversion: the KMM
model of Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) and the GHTV model of Gajdos,
Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008). With these alternative preference representa-
tions, risky portfolios and the equilibrium price always respond to new information.
However, we show numerically that neither risky portfolios nor equilibrium prices
react a lot if ambiguity aversion is suﬃciently large.
This paper complements recent work on optimal portfolios and equilibrium asset
prices when investors process public signals. Epstein and Schneider (2008) show that
investors react more to bad signals than to good signals when there is ambiguity about
the precision of these signals. Illeditsch (2011) shows that this ambiguity leads to risky
portfolios that are sensitive to news but insensitive to changes in the stock price—a
phenomenon referred to as portfolio inertia. We are the ﬁrst to show that ambiguity
aversion leads to information inertia for risky portfolios and equilibrium prices without
relying on information processing costs or other market frictions. Moreover, the
economic mechanism that leads to information inertia is novel because it does not
occur at the kink in investors’ utility in contrast to the portfolio inertia results in
Illeditsch (2011).6
This paper contributes to the literature on optimal portfolio choice with ambigu-
ity. We know from Dow and Werlang (1992), Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005), Epstein
and Schneider (2007), Easley and O’Hara (2009), and Campanale (2011) that ambi-
guity leads to portfolio inertia of the risk-free portfolio. Epstein and Wang (1994),
Epstein and Schneider (2010), and Illeditsch (2011) show that portfolio inertia can
also arise for risky portfolios. Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2007) characterize opti-
mal portfolios with multiple assets and ambiguity aversion. Uppal and Wang (2003),
Benigno and Nistico (2012), and Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2012) show that
ambiguity aversion leads to under-diversiﬁed portfolios. In contrast, we show that
6We are not aware of any work with multiple prior preferences that leads to qualitatively diﬀerent
results than standard expected utility that do are not due to the kink in utility.
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ambiguity averse investors use the unconditional asset distribution when contemplat-
ing a long (short) position with moderate risk instead of relying on a signal that
conveys bad (good) news.
Our work is also related to a large literature that studies the informational eﬃ-
ciency of prices when there is asymmetric information. For instance, prices do not
fully reveal private information in equilibrium, (i) if it is costly to acquire information
(Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1976)), (ii) if there are noise traders
(Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)), (iii) if informed investors anticipate how their trades
will impact prices (Kyle (1985) and Back, Cao, and Willard (2000)), (iv) if there
is ambiguity (Caskey (2009), Condie and Ganguli (2011), and Condie and Ganguli
(2014)).7 What is striking in this paper is that a costless informative public signal is
not always incorporated in the price when an investor is averse to ambiguity.
Our paper is also related to recent literature on portfolio choice and asset pricing
when there is ambiguity about the predictability of future asset returns/cash ﬂows.
Hansen and Sargent (2010a) study the price of risk when investors who seek robust
decision rules ﬁnd it diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate between i.i.d. consumption growth and
one with a persistent component (long run risk of Bansal and Yaron (2004)).8 Chen,
Ju, and Miao (2011) solve a dynamic consumption and portfolio choice problem when
there is ambiguity about whether stock returns are IID or predictable. Ju and Miao
(2012) and Collard, Mukerji, Sheppard, and Tallon (2011) explain many asset pricing
puzzles by introducing ambiguity into a dynamic representative agent model in which
consumption and dividends follow a hidden state regime-switching process and a
hidden state model with a persistent latent state variable, respectively. The ﬁrst
paper considers the robust control approach and the other three papers consider the
recursive smooth ambiguity model to describe preferences.9 Our focus in this paper
7Mele and Sangiorgi (2011), Ozsoylev and Werner (2011), and Tallon (1998) study the eﬀects of
ambiguity aversion on asset prices in the presence of private information and noise traders.
8For a survey of learning models when investors seek robust decision rules see Hansen and Sargent
(2007).
9Strzalecki (2011) and Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) provide axiomatic foun-
dations for the robust control model and Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), Nau (2006),
Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2009), and Hayashi and Miao (2011) provide axiomatic founda-
tions for the smooth ambiguity model and its dynamic extension.
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is on the parsimonious and tractable Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) preference model
which is a good description of ambiguity averse behavior as shown by Ahn, Choi, Gale,
and Kariv (2011) and Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010).10
There is a growing literature in macroeconomics that imposes an exogenous con-
straint or cost on the ability of investors to process information in order to explain
why macroeconomic variables exhibit inertia.11 These ideas have also been used in ﬁ-
nance to explain information inertia of portfolios (Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007)),
excess correlation (Peng and Xiong (2006)), ﬁnancial contagion (Mondria (2010)
and (Mondria and Quintana-Domeque 2012)), and portfolio under-diversiﬁcation
(Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 2010), among others.12 In contrast, we derive iner-
tia from a rational choice model with multiple prior utility. Moreover, information
inertia aﬀects investors’ utility and thus leads to a welfare loss that depends on risk
aversion and the signal.
There is an extensive literature on optimal portfolio choice when there is Bayesian
model uncertainty about the predictability of future returns (e.g. Keim and Stam-
baugh (1986), Barberis (2000), and Xia (2001) among others).13 In all these papers
investors hedge against model uncertainty but their portfolios always react to new
information. We also study portfolios and equilibrium prices when there is Bayesian
model uncertainty, which is a special case of the KMM model studied in Section IV
and show that there is no information inertia. Balduzzi and Lynch (1999), Balduzzi
and Lynch (2000), Lynch and Tan (2010), and Lynch and Tan (2011) study the ef-
fects of transaction costs on optimal portfolios when there is return predictability.
While in these papers transaction costs lead to state dependent portfolio adjustment
we derive state dependent adjustment of portfolios from a rational choice model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we introduce the
10Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame (2010) consider α-maxmin preferences to model
ambiguity aversion which in their experiment is observationally equivalent to using maxmin prefer-
ences with a smaller set of beliefs (see Ravanelli and Svindland (2014)).
11See Sims (2003), Sims (2010), and the references therein.
12See Veldkamp (2011) and the reference therein for an overview of this literature.
13For a comprehensive survey of static and dynamic portfolio choice models when returns are
predictable see Wachter (2012).
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model. In Section II, we solve for optimal portfolios and discuss the information
inertia results. In Section III we solve for equilibrium portfolios and stock prices
and discuss the informational ineﬃciency of prices and momentum, in Section IV we
show that our results are quantitatively robust to a diﬀerent preference model, and
in Section V we discuss the economic signiﬁcance of our information inertia results.
We conclude in Section VI.
I Information Structure and Preferences
Suppose there are two dates 0 and 1. Investors can invest in a risk-free asset and a
risky asset. Let p denote the price of the risky asset, d˜ the future value or dividend
of the risky asset, and θ the number of shares invested in the risky asset. There is no
consumption at date zero. The risk-free asset is used as numeraire, so the risk-free
rate is zero. Hence, future wealth w˜ is given by
w˜ = w0 +
(
d˜− p
)
θ, (1)
in which w0 denotes initial wealth.
Suppose investors receive a signal s˜ about the future value d˜ of the asset. The
joint distribution of d˜ and s˜ is normal:
⎛
⎝ d˜
s˜
⎞
⎠ ∼ N
⎛
⎝
⎛
⎝ d¯
0
⎞
⎠ ,
⎛
⎝ σ2d β
β 1
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠ , (2)
where β = Rσd. Investors do not know the correlation between d˜ and s˜ and are
ambiguity averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Hence, they consider
a family of joint distributions described by R ∈ [Ra, Rb] with Ra > 0 and Rb < 1
when making decisions.14
We follow Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) and determine the family of conditional
14There is no ambiguity about the marginal distribution of the signal and hence there is no loss
in generality by normalizing the mean and the variance of the signal to zero and one, respectively.
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dividend distributions given the signal by applying Bayes rule for each correlation.
Hence, standard normal-normal updating for each R ∈ [Ra, Rb] leads to
d˜ | s˜ = s ∼ NR
(
μ(s, R), σ2(R)
)
, (3)
where μ(s, R) = d¯ + βs denotes the conditional mean and σ(R) = σd
√
1−R2 the
conditional volatility of d˜ given s.
The utility of a multiple prior or MEU investor who holds θ shares of the risky
asset is
min
R∈[Ra,Rb]
ER
[
u
(
w0 +
(
d˜− p
)
θ
)
| s˜ = s
]
(4)
where u(·) denotes the Bernoulli utility function of the investor.
Suppose investors have CARA utility over future wealth w˜, that is, u(w˜) = −e−γw˜
with γ > 0 and let CE(θ) denote the certainty equivalent of an MEU investor. Hence,
the investor’s utility given in equation (4) is equal to u (CE(θ)) with
CE(θ) = min
R∈[Ra,Rb]
CE(θ, R), (5)
where CE(θ, R) denotes the certainty equivalent of a standard expected utility or
SEU investor with belief R. Speciﬁcally,
CE(θ, R) = ER [w˜ | s˜ = s]− 1
2
γVarR [w˜ | s˜ = s] . (6)
The assumption of CARA utility and normal beliefs lead to mean-variance preferences
over future wealth with ambiguity aversion about the mean and variance described by
the interval [Ra, Rb]. Investors are more averse to ambiguity (in the sense of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989)) if the interval [Ra, Rb] is large and hence we measure the
degree of aversion to ambiguity by the size of the interval.15
15The preference model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) does not allow for a distinction between
ambiguity and aversion to ambiguity. We consider in Section IV and the internet appendix preference
models that allow for a distinction between ambiguity and ambiguity aversion.
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II Portfolio Choice
We are interested in the sensitivity of optimal portfolios to changes in the signal and
hence for the remainder of this section we ﬁx the price p and determine the optimal
portfolio for the risky asset as a function of the signal.
Let θ¯(s, R) denote the optimal portfolio of an SEU investor with belief R and θ(s)
the optimal portfolio of an MEU investor. The optimal portfolio of an SEU investor
is
θ¯(s, R) =
ER
[
d˜ | s˜ = s
]
− p
γVarR
[
d˜ | s˜ = s
] = λ(s, R)
γσ(R)
. (7)
where λ(s, R) = μ(s,R)−p
σ(R)
denotes the conditional Sharpe ratio of the asset.
For the SEU investor an increase in the signal will always lead to an increase in
the demand for the asset and hence optimal portfolios always react to news. This is
no longer true when investors are averse to ambiguity as the next theorem shows.
Theorem 1 (Portfolio Choice). Let λd =
d¯−p
σd
denote the unconditional Sharpe ratio
of the asset. The optimal portfolio for an MEU investor with risk aversion γ and
ambiguity aversion described by [Ra, Rb] who receives the signal s is
θ(s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
λ(s,Ra)
γσ(Ra)
s ≥ s1 ≡ −Ramax(λd, 0)− 1Ra min(λd, 0)
max
(
λd
γσd
, 0
)
s1 > s ≥ s2 ≡ −Rbmax(λd, 0)− 1Rb min(λd, 0)
λ(s,Rb)
γσ(Rb)
s2 > s ≥ s3 ≡ − 1Rb max(λd, 0)−Rbmin(λd, 0)
min
(
λd
γσd
, 0
)
s3 > s ≥ s4 ≡ − 1Ra max(λd, 0)−Ramin(λd, 0)
λ(s,Ra)
γσ(Ra)
s < s4.
(8)
Suppose the unconditional Sharpe ratio is positive (λd > 0). The left graph of
Figure 1 shows that the optimal portfolio does not always react to signals that convey
news that is worse than expected. Speciﬁcally, there is a range of bad signals for which
investors do not adjust their long position in the risky asset and there is another range
of bad signals for which investors do not hold the risky asset. We brieﬂy discuss the
intuition for information inertia of the risk-free portfolio next and then focus on the
intuition for risky portfolios for the remainder of this section.
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Figure 1: Portfolio Choice
The left graph shows the optimal portfolio and the right graph shows the investors’
perceived (log of the) conditional Sharpe ratio and volatility as a function of the
signal. Red lines represent an SEU investor with belief βb = Rbσd = 4, purple lines
represent an SEU investor with belief βm = σd(Ra+Rb)/2 = 3, blue lines represent an
SEU investor with belief βa = Raσd = 2, green lines represent an SEU investor with
belief R0 = 0, and black lines represent an MEU investor with ambiguity aversion
([Ra, Rb]). In the right graph dashed lines represent the Sharpe ratio and chain-dotted
lines the volatility. The parameters are d¯ = 100, p = 95, σ2d = 20, and γ = 1.
Why does the risk-free portfolio exhibit information inertia? To answer this
question consider ﬁrst an SEU investor with belief R and recall that the conditional
Sharpe ratio is
λ(s, R) =
μ(s, R)− p
σ(R)
=
λd +Rs√
1− R2 . (9)
An SEU investor would buy the asset if the conditional Sharpe ratio is positive and
sell short the asset if the conditional Sharpe ratio is negative. There is only one signal
realization for which the conditional Sharpe ratio is zero and thus an SEU investor
would refrain from holding the asset. In contrast, MEU investors only buy the asset
if there is no ambiguity that the conditional Sharpe ratio is positive and sell short
the asset if there is no ambiguity that the conditional Sharpe ratio is negative. There
is a range of bad signals (− λd
Ra
< s < − λd
Rb
) for which the conditional Sharpe ratio is
positive for some R and negative for others and thus the risk-free portfolio exhibits
information inertia.16
16This form of inertia also appears in Condie and Ganguli (2011) and Illeditsch (2011).
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The risk-free portfolio is the only portfolio that perfectly hedges against ambiguity
by making utility independent of the unknown parameter R. All other portfolios are
exposed to ambiguity. The next propositions shows that all these portfolios can be
determined by evaluating the optimal portfolio of an SEU investor at the belief R that
minimizes her utility. Put diﬀerently, an MEU investor behaves distinctly diﬀerent
from an SEU investor at a kink of her utility which in this model only occurs at the
risk-free portfolio.17
Proposition 1 (Characterization of Optimal Portfolios). Let λd > 0. Then
θ(s) =
{
0 if − λd
Ra
≤ s ≤ − λd
Rb
θ¯(s, R∗(s)) otherwise,
(10)
where
R∗(s) = argmin
R∈[Ra,Rb]
CE(θ(s), R). (11)
We show in the next proposition that the belief R∗(s) that minimizes utility at the
optimal risky portfolio can be determined from the conditional Sharpe ratio λ(s, R)
and therefore does not require prior knowledge of the optimal portfolio θ(s).
Proposition 2 (Robust Sharpe Ratio). Let λd > 0. If s > − λdRb , then θ¯(s, R) > 0 for
all R ∈ [Ra, Rb] and
R∗(s) = argmin
R∈[Ra,Rb]
λ(s, R) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Ra if s > −Raλd
− s
λd
if −Rbλd < s ≤ −Raλd
Rb if − λdRb < s ≤ −Rbλd.
(12)
If s < − λd
Ra
, then θ¯(s, R) < 0 for all R ∈ [Ra, Rb] and
R∗(s) = argmax
R∈[Ra,Rb]
λ(s, R) = Ra. (13)
Propositions 1 & 2 show that an investor who is averse to ambiguity about the
correlation R chooses a portfolio that is robust to changes in the conditional Sharpe
ratio λ(s, R). Speciﬁcally, an MEU investor with a long position considers the belief
17Illeditsch (2011) considers a model where kinks also occur away from certainty.
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R that minimizes λ(s, R) and an MEU investor with a short position considers the
belief R that maximizes λ(s, R).
To gain intuition suppose there is no ambiguity that the conditional Sharpe ratio
is positive (s > − λd
Rb
) and thus the MEU investor is long in the asset. If the signal
conveys good news (s > 0), then an increase in the correlation R always increases
the conditional Sharpe ratio because a more informative signal raises the conditional
mean and reduces the conditional volatility. Hence, the MEU investor behaves like an
SEU investor with belief Ra and thus the portfolio reacts moderately to news (blue
dashed line in Figure 1). However, if the signal conveys bad news (s < 0), then an
increase in the correlation R decreases the conditional mean and volatility and thus
the eﬀects on the conditional Sharpe ratio are unclear. For moderately bad news
(−Raλd ≤ s < 0), the volatility eﬀect dominates and the portfolio reacts moderately
(blue dashed line in Figure 1). Whereas for worse news (− λd
Rb
< s ≤ −Rbλd) the mean
eﬀect dominates and thus the portfolio reacts strongly to news (red chain-dotted line
in Figure 1).18
There is a range of bad signals (−Rbλd < s < −Raλd) for which neither the con-
ditional mean nor volatility dominates and the conditional Sharpe ratio is minimized
in the interior. Hence, small changes in the correlation change both the mean and
volatility but leave the Sharpe ratio unchanged. The interior minimizer depends on
the signal, that is R∗ = − s
λd
, because a change in the signal aﬀects only the mean
directly, the correlation changes in order to have a counterbalancing indirect eﬀect
on volatility. We know from Propositions 1 & 2 that in this case the MEU investor
behaves like an SEU investor with belief R∗ = − s
λd
but the portfolio does not react
to news and hence coincides with the portfolio of an SEU investor who thinks the
correlation between the signal and the asset is zero (green solid line in Figure 1).19
Why are there risky portfolios that do not react to news even though there is
18If s < − λdRa , then there is no ambiguity that the conditional Sharpe ratio is negative and thus
the MEU investor is short the asset. In this case the worst case scenario is always a low correlation.
19The utility of the SEU investor with belief R = 0 is strictly greater than the utility of the SEU
investor with belief R∗ = − sλd ≥ Ra > 0.
13
no ambiguity about the fact that the signal is informative (Ra > 0)? To answer
this question suppose s = −0.75 in which case the optimal portfolio of the MEU
investor and an SEU investor with belief Rm = (Ra + Rb)/2 coincide (left graph of
Figure 1). An increase in the signal raises the Sharpe ratio perceived by the SEU and
MEU investor and thus makes the asset more attractive. The perceived risk for the
SEU investor does not change and thus her demand for the asset increases (dotted
line). However, an increase in the signal also increases the risk perceived by the MEU
investor because in this case the perceived correlation between the asset and signal
decreases and thus less risk is resolved by the signal. The increase in the Sharpe ratio
is exactly oﬀset by the increase in the volatility and thus the MEU investor does not
change her portfolio (black solid line). Formally,
d ln θ(s) = d lnλ (s, R∗(s))− d lnσ (R∗(s)) = 0, ∀s ∈ (−Rbλd,−Raλd). (14)
The right graph of Figure 1 shows the (log) of the conditional Sharpe ratio and
volatility when the signal conveys bad news. There is a range of signals for which
both the Sharpe ratio and volatility are strictly increasing in the signal. Moreover,
the Sharpe ratio increases with the signal at exactly the same rate as the volatility
increases with the signal in this range. Hence, any change of the portfolio due to
changes in the Sharpe ratio is exactly oﬀset by a change in risk.
Suppose the unconditional Sharpe ratio is zero (λd = 0). There is no informa-
tion inertia because the MEU investor behaves like an SEU investor with belief Ra.
Intuitively, investors will long the asset when news is good and they will short the
asset when news is bad. But there is no confusion about the interpretation of the
signal when news is good (bad) and investors are long (short) the asset because the
worst case scenario for the conditional Sharpe ratio and volatility of the asset is a
signal with a low correlation R. Suppose the unconditional Sharpe ratio is negative
(λd < 0). In this case the risk-free portfolio and a portfolio consisting of a short
position in the asset exhibits information inertia. The intuition is similar to the case
where the unconditional Sharpe ratio is positive and thus omitted.
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We determine the quantitative signiﬁcance of the information inertia results in
Section V and conclude this section with a summary of the portfolio choice results.
Model Predictions 1 (Information Inertia of Portfolios). If investors are averse to
ambiguity about the predictability of future asset values, then
(i) there is a range of bad signals over which investors do not adjust their long
position in the asset when the unconditional Sharpe ratio is positive,
(ii) there is a range of good signals over which investors do not adjust their short
position in the asset when the unconditional Sharpe ratio is negative, and
(iii) there is a range of good and bad signals over which investors do not hold the
asset when the unconditional Sharpe ratio is not zero.
III Equilibrium Price and Portfolio
In this section, we determine the price of the risky asset in equilibrium when the
economy is populated by investors who all receive the same signal about its future
cash ﬂows but may diﬀer with respect to risk and ambiguity aversion. We show that
there is a range of bad signals over which investors do not adjust their risky portfolios
in equilibrium and thus prices do not always incorporate public information that is
worse than expected. Moreover, we show that this informational ineﬃciency leads to
price underreaction consistent with momentum.
Suppose there are H investors who all receive the signal s˜ about the future value
of the dividend d˜. Investors may diﬀer with respect to their initial wealth, and their
aversion to risk and ambiguity. Let w0h denote investor h’s initial wealth, γh > 0
her risk aversion coeﬃcient, and [Rah, Rbh] the interval that represents her ambiguity
aversion with 0 < Rah ≤ Rbh < 1 ∀ h ∈ {1, . . . , H}.
An equilibrium in this economy is deﬁned as follows:
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). The signal-to-price map p(s) is an equilibrium if and
15
only if (i) each investor chooses a portfolio θh to maximize
min
Rh∈[Rah,Rbh]
ERh
[
uh
(
w0h +
(
d˜− p(s)
)
θh
)
| s˜ = s
]
, ∀s ∈ R (15)
and (ii) markets clear, that is,
∑H
h=1 θh = 1 and investors consume the liquidating
dividend d˜ at date 1.
A Homogeneous Ambiguity Aversion
We know that if all investors are standard expected utility maximizers, then there
exists a representative investor (SEU-RI) with these preferences.20 We show in the
next proposition that this is still true when all investors have the same aversion to
ambiguity and we determine the utility of the ambiguity averse representative investor
(MEU-RI) in equilibrium.21
Proposition 3 (MEU-RI and Equilibrium Utility). Assume that all investors have
the same ambiguity aversion [Ra, Rb]. Then there exists a representative investor
with initial wealth w0 =
∑H
h=1w0h and aggregate risk tolerance 1/γ ≡
∑H
h=1 1/γh.
Moreover, the utility of the MEU-RI in equilibrium is
min
R∈[Ra,Rb]
ER
[
u
(
d˜
)
| s˜ = s
]
= u
(
μ (s, R∗(s))− 1
2
γσ2 (R∗(s))
)
, (16)
where
R∗(s) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Ra if s ≥ −γσdRa
− s
γσd
if −γσdRb < s < −γσdRa
Rb if s ≤ −γσdRb.
(17)
For the remainder of this subsection we consider a representative investor (MEU-
RI) with initial wealth w0, risk aversion γ, and ambiguity aversion [Ra, Rb].
22 Her
equilibrium utility is determined by minimizing the equilibrium utility of an SEU-RI
over her belief R. The utility of the SEU-RI is strictly increasing in the posterior
mean of the dividend and strictly decreasing in the residual variance of the dividend.
20See Chapter 7 in Back (2010).
21Wakai (2007) and Illeditsch (2011) show that there exists a representative investor when investors
have the same aversion to ambiguity but diﬀer w.r.t. their CARA coeﬃcient.
22We discuss the properties of the equilibrium price when investors have diﬀerent ambiguity aver-
sion in the next subsection.
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Hence, the belief R that minimizes the SEU-RI’s utility depends on the nature of the
news.
Suppose the signal conveys bad news (s < 0), then the worst case for the posterior
mean μ(s, R) is a high correlation because in this case the investor signiﬁcantly revises
the value of the dividend downwards whereas the worst case for the residual variance
σ2(R) is a low correlation because in this case there is less risk resolved by the signal.
If the signal conveys very bad news (s ≤ −γσdRb), then the mean dominates and
the MEU-RI investor behaves like an SEU-RI investor with belief Rb. If the signal
conveys moderately bad or good news (s ≥ −γσdRa), then the MEU-RI investor
behaves like an SEU-RI investor with belief Ra. There is a range of bad signal values
(−γσdRb < s < −γσdRa) for which neither the posterior mean nor the residual
variance dominates and utility is minimized in the interior.
The equilibrium price when the representative investor is an SEU investor with
belief R is
p¯(s, R) = ER
[
d˜ | s˜ = s
]
− γVarR
[
d˜ | s˜ = s
]
= μ(s, R)− γσ2(R). (18)
The price of the asset is strictly increasing in the signal and hence it fully incorporates
all available information. This is no longer true when the representative investor is
averse to ambiguity as the next theorem shows.
Theorem 2 (Equilibrium Price). Consider an economy with an MEU-RI with risk
aversion γ and ambiguity aversion [Ra, Rb] who receives the signal s. There is a
unique equilibrium price,
p(s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
ERa
[
d˜ | s˜ = s
]
− γVarRa
[
d˜ | s˜ = s
]
if s > −γσdRa
E
[
d˜
]
− γVar
[
d˜
]
if −γσdRb ≤ s ≤ −γσdRa
ERb
[
d˜ | s˜ = s
]
− γVarRb
[
d˜ | s˜ = s
]
if s < −γσdRb.
(19)
Moreover, p(s) = p¯ (s, R∗(s)) where p¯ (·) is given in equation (18) and R∗(s) is given
in equation (17).
The left graph of Figure 2 shows the equilibrium price as a function of the signal.
17
The price reacts moderately to signals that convey good and moderately bad news
and it reacts strongly to signals that convey very bad news. There is a range of signals
that convey bad news for which the price does not react even though the utility of
the RI is sensitive to changes in these signals.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Price
The left graph shows the equilibrium price and the right graph shows the RI’s per-
ceived posterior mean and variance as a function of the signal. Red lines represent
an SEU-RI economy with belief βb = Rbσd = 3, purple lines represent an SEU-RI
economy with belief βm = σd(Ra + Rb)/2 = 2, blue lines represent an SEU-RI econ-
omy with belief βa = Raσd = 1, green lines represent an SEU-RI economy with belief
R0 = 0, and black lines represent an MEU-RI economy with ambiguity aversion
[Ra, Rb]. In the right graph dashed lines represent the mean and chain-dotted lines
the variance. The parameters are d¯ = 100, σ2d = 25, and γ = 1.
Why does the price not always incorporate signals that convey bad news? We
know from Theorem 2 that the equilibrium price p(s) coincides with the equilibrium
price p¯(s, R∗(s)) in an economy with an SEU-RI whose belief about the correlation
minimizes her utility from consuming the dividend.23 Consider a two standard devi-
ation bad news surprise (s = −2). In this case the equilibrium price is p = 75 when
there is ambiguity aversion and when there is no ambiguity aversion βm = 2 (see left
graph of Figure 2). If the signal decreases, then the SEU-RI requires a lower price
as compensation for the lower posterior mean in order to hold the market portfolio.
23We know from the previous section that an MEU investor behaves diﬀerently from an SEU
investor only if she holds the risk-free portfolio which is not an equilibrium allocation.
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However, the MEU-RI revises the worst case scenario belief about R upwards if the
signal drops. The price does not change because the lower posterior mean that would
require a drop in the equilibrium price is exactly oﬀset by the lower risk premium
that would require an increase in the price. Formally,
dp(s) = dμ(s, R∗(s))− γdσ2(R∗(s)) = 0, ∀ s ∈ (−γσdRb,−γσdRa). (20)
The right graph of Figure 2 shows the posterior mean and residual variance per-
ceived by the MEU-RI as a function of the signal. The graph shows that there is
a range of signals for which both the mean and variance are strictly increasing in
the signal. Moreover, the posterior mean increases at the same rate as the residual
variance increases in this signal range. Hence, any change in the price due to changes
in the posterior mean is exactly oﬀset by a change in the residual variance.
B Heterogeneous Ambiguity Aversion
We show in the next proposition that equilibrium prices still fail to incorporate all
available public information when investors are heterogeneous in their ambiguity aver-
sion.24
Proposition 4 (Information Inertia). Let 1/γ ≡ ∑Hh=1 1/γh denote aggregate risk
tolerance and let [Ra, Rb] ≡
⋂H
h=1[Rah, Rbh] 
= ∅. Then the equilibrium price is
p(s) = E
[
d˜
]
− γVar
[
d˜
]
∀ s ∈ [−γσdRb,−γσdRa] . (21)
24We do not report the equilibrium price outside of the inaction region but provide numerical
examples in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Price and Portfolio
The left graph shows the equilibrium price and the right graph shows the equilibrium
portfolios as a function of the signal in an economy populated with heterogenous MEU
investors. The blue chain-dotted line shows the optimal portfolio of an MEU investor
with ambiguity aversion [Ra1, Rb1] = [0.1, 0.4] and the red dashed line shows the
optimal portfolio of an MEU investor with ambiguity aversion [Ra2, Rb2] = [0.2, 0.6].
There is a range of signals ([−2,−1]) for which investors’ portfolios and thus the
equilibrium price do not react to news. The parameters are d¯ = 100, σ2d = 25 and
γ1 = γ2 = 1.
To gain intuition consider an economy populated by two MEU investors with am-
biguity aversion [Ra1, Rb1] = [0.1, 0.4] and [Ra2, Rb2] = [0.2, 0.6], respectively. The left
graph of Figure 3 shows the equilibrium price and the right graph shows their equi-
librium portfolios as a function of the signal. Consider the ﬁve diﬀerent signal regions
(i) (−∞,−3.15], (ii) [−3.15,−2], (iii) [−2,−1], (iv) [−1,−0.5], and (v) [−0.5,∞).
Both MEU investors behave like SEU investors with beliefs Rb1 = 0.4 and Rb2 = 0.6
in the ﬁrst signal range and thus the equilibrium price reacts a lot to these signals.
The equilibrium portfolio of the second MEU investor (red dashed line) is increasing
in the signal because her worst case scenario belief (Rb2 = 0.6) is larger than the
worst case scenario belief of the second MEU investor (blue chain-dotted line) and
thus she puts more weight on the signal. The analysis is similar for the ﬁfth signal
range because with good news the worst case scenario for both investors is a low R.
For the other three ranges of signals there is at least one investor who ignores the
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signal and uses her prior when choosing her optimal portfolio. In other words, there
is at least one investor who behaves as if the signal is uninformative even though her
utility is negatively aﬀected by it. Consider the second signal range. The ﬁrst MEU
investor still behaves like an SEU investor with belief Rb1 = 0.4 but the second MEU
investor does not rely on the signal. Hence her demand, which is increasing for the
ﬁrst range of signals, is now decreasing because neither mean nor variance depends
on the signal and the equilibrium price increases with it. The equilibrium price still
reacts to signals in the second region because of the ﬁrst investor but not as much as
for the ﬁrst range of signals. Both investors do not rely on the signals in the third
region and hence the equilibrium price does not reﬂect these signals. The intuition
for the fourth signal range is similar to the second. In this case the ﬁrst investor does
not rely on the signal when choosing her optimal portfolio and hence in equilibrium
her asset demand decreases with the signal.
There is no information inertia in optimal portfolios of SEU investors and hence
the equilibrium price always responds to changes in the signals in their presence. But
how much do SEU investors move the price? To answer this question, we consider
a unit mass of investors where α denotes the fraction of MEU investors and 1 − α
denotes the fraction of SEU investors. The left graph of Figure 4 shows that there
is a range of signals for which prices do not respond a lot to news if the fraction of
MEU investors is suﬃciently large.
C Momentum
We show in this subsection that the insensitivity of price to bad news and the un-
derreaction to good and moderately bad news leads to momentum. Moreover, the
economic signiﬁcance of momentum depends on the unconditional risk premium of
the asset.
Let Rˆ denote the correlation between d˜ and s˜ that generates the data with Rˆ =
(Ra + Rb)/2.
25 Consider a time series of dividends and stock prices generated from
25It is common in the literature (e.g. Hansen and Sargent (2001)) to assume that midpoint of the
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the CARA-normal model with representative SEU or MEU investors. Suppose an
econometrician regresses future price changes on a constant and the current stock
price p(s). Speciﬁcally,
d− p(s) = constant + slope× p(s) + noise. (22)
The right graph of Figure 4 shows the slope of this predictability regression as a func-
tion of the unconditional risk premium of the asset for four diﬀerent representative
agent economies. The green solid line represents an economy in which the belief of
the SEU-RI coincides with the data generating belief Rˆ. In this case the stock price
incorporates all available information and thus the slope is zero. The blue dashed
line represents an economy in which the SEU-RI perceives a higher R than the econo-
metrician and the red chain-dotted line represents an economy in which the SEU-RI
perceives a lower R than the econometrician. In this case the stock price incorporates
all available information but does so incorrectly from the econometrician’s point of
view. Hence, the price underreacts in the ﬁrst economy consistent with momentum
and overreacts in the second economy consistent with reversals.
The black solid line represents an economy with an MEU-RI. In this case, there
is momentum if the unconditional risk premium of the asset is suﬃciently large.26
If the unconditional risk premium of the stock is large, then the slope is positive
because moderate price reactions to news are more likely than strong price reactions
to news. For stocks with intermediate risk, the economic signiﬁcance is larger than in
an economy with an SEU-RI with belief Ra because in this case many bad signals are
not reﬂected in the stock price. In contrast, for every homogenous and heterogeneous
SEU investors economy with beliefs R ∈ [Ra, Rb] the slope of the regression in equation
(22) lies between the red chain-dotted and blue dashed line and does not depend on
the unconditional risk premium.
ambiguity interval generates the data.
26This dependence on the unconditional risk premium may help to distinguish our explanation of
proﬁtable momentum strategies from other explanations. See Jegadeesh and Titman (2011) and the
references therein for review of momentum strategies.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Price and Momentum
The left graph shows the equilibrium price as a function of the signal when there is
a unit mass of investors where α denotes the fraction of MEU investors and 1 − α
denotes the fraction of SEU investors. If α increases, then there is a range of signals
for which prices do not respond a lot to news. The right graph shows the slope of a
regression of future price changes on current prices. If the unconditional risk premium
of the asset is suﬃciently large, then the slope is positive which is consistent with
momentum. The parameters are d¯ = 100, σ2d = 25, Ra = 0.2, Rb = 0.6, and γ = 1.
We conclude this section with a summary of our results.
Model Predictions 2 (Information Inertia of Equilibrium Portfolios, Informational
Ineﬃciency, and Momentum). If investors are averse to ambiguity about the pre-
dictability of future cash ﬂows, then
(i) prices do not always incorporate public signals that convey bad news,
(ii) there is a range of bad signals over which investors do not adjust their risky
portfolio positions in equilibrium,
(iii) and the informational ineﬃciency of prices and the resulting underreaction leads
to momentum.
IV Parameter Uncertainty and the Smooth Model
We have shown so far that ambiguity aversion leads to portfolios and prices that do not
react to news in equilibrium. We study in this section the implications for portfolio
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choice and asset pricing when investors face Bayesian model or parameter uncertainty
and we distinguish between ambiguity and aversion to ambiguity by considering the
smooth ambiguity model axiomatized in Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005).
We show that there are signal regions for which portfolios and prices show very low
sensitivity to news if aversion to ambiguity is suﬃciently high.
Consider the model described in Section I and assume that the correlation between
the signal and the dividend is random. Let P denote the prior distribution for R˜ with
support [Ra, Rb] ⊂ (0, 1).27 The joint distribution of d˜ and s˜ conditional on knowing
the correlation R is normal and given in equation (2). Hence, standard Bayesian
updating leads to
d˜ | s˜ = s, R˜ = R ∼ NR
(
μ(s, R), σ2(R)
)
. (23)
The investor does not learn anything about the correlation R after observing the
signal and hence the prior P coincides with the posterior.28 Let u(·) denote the
function that measures attitudes toward risk and φ(·) the function that measures
attitudes towards ambiguity. The utility of an ambiguity averse investor in the sense
of Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) who holds θ shares of the risky asset is
therefore
EP [φ (ER˜ [u (w˜) | s˜ = s])] = EP
[
φ
(
u
(
CE(θ, R˜)
])]
, (24)
where CE(θ, R) denotes the certainty equivalent of an SEU investor with dogmatic
belief R. If φ(·) is linear, then investors are neutral to ambiguity and thus we call
them BMU investors (investors who face Bayesian model uncertainty) otherwise we
call them KMM investors.
For the remainder of this section we assume that investors have constant absolute
risk aversion and constant relative ambiguity aversion, that is, u(w) = −e−γw and
27The SEU investors of the previous sections have dogmatic priors over the correlation R.
28Investors can draw inferences about the correlation R, if they observe a time series of d˜ and s˜.
In this case P in equation (24) below would be the distribution of R˜ conditional on observing the
signal s˜ = s.
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φ(u) = − 1
1+α
(−u)1+α with γ positive and α nonnegative.29 Hence, the certainty
equivalent CE(θ, R) is given in equation (6).
A Portfolio Choice
Let θ(s) denote the portfolio of a KMM investor that maximizes utility given in
equation (24). The properties of θ(s) are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 (Portfolio Choice). For every distribution P with support [Ra, Rb] ⊂
[0, 1] such that utility given in equation (24) exists, let Q (R; s, θ(s)) denote the risk
and ambiguity adjusted distribution of R˜ conditional on s˜ = s. Speciﬁcally,
dQ (R; s, θ(s)) =
e−γ(1+α)(σdsR θ(s)+
1
2
γσ2dR
2θ(s)2)
EP
[
e−γ(1+α)(σdsR˜ θ(s)+
1
2
γσ2dR˜
2θ(s)2)
]dP(R) (25)
The optimal portfolio is unique and implicitly given by
θ(s) =
λQ (s, θ(s))
γσQ (s, θ(s))
(26)
where
σQ (s, θ(s)) = σd
√
1− EQ(R;s,θ(s))
[
R˜2 | s˜ = s
]
(27)
λQ (s, θ(s)) =
d¯− p+ σdsEQ(R;s,θ(s))
[
R˜ | s˜ = s
]
σQ (s, θ(s))
. (28)
Why does the Sharpe ratio and volatility depend on the position in the asset?
To answer this question consider ﬁrst the case where α = 0. The BMU investor
hedges against parameter uncertainty by adjusting its distribution for risk. The risk
adjusted probability Q depends on the position in the asset because the eﬀects of
diﬀerent realizations of R˜ on utility depend on the asset position. For instance,
suppose an investor who contemplates a long position in the asset receives a signal
that conveys bad news. If the long position is very large, then the investor is more
29We choose constant absolute risk aversion for u(·) so that conditional on knowing R investors
have mean-variance preferences. The choice of constant relative ambiguity aversion for φ(·) simpliﬁes
the analysis but does not change the qualitative result of this section.
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concerned about the residual variance and thus the risk adjusted probability of low
correlation states is higher than the actual probability of these states. Similarly,
for a moderate long position in the asset, the investor is more concerned about a
low posterior mean and thus the risk adjusted probability of high correlation states
exceeds the actual probability of these states.30 A KMM investor is also averse to
ambiguity and thus puts additional weight on the states of the world for which R
has adverse eﬀects on utility. An increase in risk aversion would also make a BMU
investor more concerned about parameter uncertainty. However, an increase in risk
aversion has the indirect eﬀect of decreasing the asset position which makes her less
concerned about parameter uncertainty. The smooth model alleviates this tension by
having an additional parameter that increases the aversion to parameter uncertainty.
The left graph of Figure 5 shows the optimal portfolio as a function of the signal
when the unconditional Sharpe ratio is positive and R˜ is uniformly distributed on
the interval [Ra, Rb]. The black solid line represents an MEU investor, the red solid
line represents a BMU investor (α = 0), and the other three lines represent KMM
investors with diﬀerent degrees of ambiguity aversion α. There is a range of signals for
which risky portfolios become less and less sensitive to news as ambiguity aversion
increases. Moreover, the ﬁgure shows that there are signal ranges for which asset
demand is strictly increasing in α, which is consistent with Gollier (2011) who also
ﬁnds that an increase in aversion to ambiguity does not always lead to a decrease in
asset demand.
Why does the sensitivity to news for some risky portfolios decrease with aversion
to ambiguity? The intuition for this result is similar to the intuition for the informa-
tion inertia result. Asset demand for a KMM investor is increasing in the Sharpe ratio
and decreasing in the volatility of the asset. Both the Sharpe ratio and volatility are
determined by averaging over R˜ using the risk and ambiguity adjusted probability Q.
The risk and ambiguity adjustment depends on the signal and thus the conditional
volatility and Sharpe ratio depend on the signal. The right graph of Figure 5 shows
30There is no parameter uncertainty for the risk free portfolio and thus Q and P coincide.
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Figure 5: Optimal Portfolio
The left graph shows the optimal portfolio and the right graph shows the risk and
ambiguity adjusted (log of the) conditional Sharpe ratio and volatility as a function
of the signal. The black lines represent an MEU investor, the red lines represent a
BMU investor (α = 0), and the other lines represent KMM investors with diﬀerent
degrees of ambiguity aversion α. In the right graph dashed lines represent the Sharpe
ratio and chain-dotted lines the volatility. The parameter R is uniformly distributed
on the interval [Ra, Rb] = [0.2, 0.6] and d¯ = 100, p = 75, σ
2
d = 25, and γ = 1.
the (log) of the conditional Sharpe ratio and volatility perceived by a KMM investor
for diﬀerent degrees of ambiguity aversion α. If α is suﬃciently large, then there is
a range of signals for which both the conditional Sharpe ratio and volatility increase
at approximately the same rate and thus the portfolio does not react much to these
signals.31
B Equilibrium Price
Suppose there exists a representative investor with prior P over the correlation R˜.
In equilibrium the representative investor holds the asset (θ = 1) and consumes the
liquidating dividend d˜. The properties of the equilibrium price are summarized in the
next proposition.
31There is also a range of signals for which the risk-free portfolio does not react much to news if
α is suﬃciently large.
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Proposition 6. The unique equilibrium price is
p(s) = d¯− γσ2d + sσd EQ(R,s)
[
R˜ | s˜ = s
]
+ γσ2dEQ(R,s)
[
R˜2 | s˜ = s
]
, (29)
where Q(R, s) denotes the risk and ambiguity adjusted equilibrium distribution of the
correlation R˜ conditional on s˜ = s. Speciﬁcally,
dQ(R; s) =
e−γ(1+α)(σdsR+
1
2
γσ2dR
2)
EP
[
e−γ(1+α)(σdsR˜+
1
2
γσ2dR˜
2)
]dP(R). (30)
The left graph of Figure 6 shows the equilibrium price as a function of the signal
when R˜ is uniformly distributed on the interval [Ra, Rb]. The black solid line repre-
sents an economy with an MEU-RI the red solid line represents an economy with a
BMU-RI (α = 0), and the other three lines represent economies with a KMM-RI with
diﬀerent degrees of ambiguity aversion α. There is a range of signals for which the
equilibrium price becomes less sensitive to changes in the signal when α increases.
−3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −0.5
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
Signal
E
qu
ili
br
iu
m
 P
ric
e
Smooth Model
 
 
BMU ( = 0 )
KMM ( = 1 )
KMM ( = 5 )
KMM ( = 15 )
MEU
−3.5 −3 −2.5 −2 −1.5 −1 −0.5
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
Signal
M
ea
n
Smooth Model
 
 
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
V
ar
ia
nc
e
BMU ( = 0 )
KMM ( = 1 )
KMM ( = 5 )
KMM ( = 15 )
MEU
Figure 6: Equilibrium Price
The left graph shows the equilibrium price and the right graph shows the risk and
ambiguity adjusted conditional mean and variance as a function of the signal. The
black lines represent an MEU investor, the red lines represent a BMU investor (α = 0),
and the other three lines represent KMM investors with diﬀerent ambiguity aversion
α. In the right graph dashed lines represent the mean and chain-dotted lines the
variance. The parameter R is uniformly distributed on the interval [Ra, Rb] and
d¯ = 100, σ2d = 25, and γ = 1.
Why does the sensitivity of the equilibrium price to news decrease with aversion
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to ambiguity? Intuitively, the price increases with the posterior mean and decreases
with the posterior variance. The RI hedges against risk and ambiguity and thus both
the mean and variance depend on the signal. The right graph of Figure 6 shows that
there is a range of signal values for which both the risk and ambiguity adjusted mean
and variance increase at approximately the same rate and thus the equilibrium price
does not react much to these signals.
V Calibration
In this section we focus on the quantitative signiﬁcance of information inertia. Sup-
pose s˜ is a standardized predictor of y˜ where y˜ is either the future excess returns or
divided growth rate of the market portfolio. The unconditional mean and variance
of y˜ are y¯ and σ2y , respectively. Investors are averse to ambiguity about the correla-
tion between y˜ and s˜ and consider a family of linear regression models described by
R ∈ [Ra, Rb]. Speciﬁcally,
y˜ = α + βs˜+ ε, α = y¯, β = Rσy, ε˜ ∼ N
(
0, σ2y(1− R2)
)
. (31)
We use a conﬁdence interval for the correlation R as a proxy for ambiguity aver-
sion.32 Let Rˆ denote the point estimate for the correlation R, aˆ the signiﬁcance level
of the conﬁdence interval [Ra, Rb], and T the size of the data sample.
33 The size of
the interval is strictly decreasing in the signiﬁcance level aˆ and hence α = 1 − aˆ can
be interpreted as a measure for ambiguity aversion.
We consider 84 observations of y˜ and s˜, that is, T = 84 and three diﬀerent
32Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang (2007) use a conﬁdence interval for expected stock returns as a
proxy for ambiguity aversion.
33The conﬁdence interval (see Fisher (1921)) for the correlation R is [Ra, Rb] with
Ra = tanh
(
artanh
(
Rˆ
)
− Φ−1
(
1− aˆ
2
)
1√
T − 3
)
(32)
Rb = tanh
(
artanh
(
Rˆ
)
+Φ−1
(
1− aˆ
2
)
1√
T − 3
)
. (33)
29
values for the point estimate of the correlation, that is, Rˆ ∈ {30%, 40%, 50%}. These
estimates correspond to R2s in predictive regressions ranging from 0.09 to 0.25.34 We
focus on predictors for excess returns that are statistically signiﬁcant to determine
the probability of information inertia in optimal portfolios and we focus on predictors
for dividend growth that are statistically signiﬁcant to determine the probability of
information inertia in equilibrium prices. Hence Ra > 0 in both cases. If we allow
for insigniﬁcant predictors (0 ∈ [Ra, Rb]) then the probability of information inertia
is higher.
A Information Inertia of Portfolios
Suppose the signal s˜ predicts future excess returns r˜e, that is, y˜ = r˜e, y¯ = μe, and
σy = σe in equation (31). Let θ denote the fraction of wealth invested in the risky
asset and 1 − θ the fraction of wealth invested in the risk-free asset. Investors are
averse to ambiguity in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and have mean-
variance preferences over excess returns. Hence, the optimal portfolio of an MEU
investor maximizes
min
R∈[Ra,Rb]
(
ER [r˜e | s˜ = s] θ − 1
2
γ VarR [r˜e | s˜ = s] θ2
)
, (34)
where ER [r˜e | s˜ = s] = α + βs and VarR [r˜e | s˜ = s] = σ2e(1− R2).
The optimal portfolio of an SEU investors with mean-variance preferences and
belief R is
θ¯(s, R) =
ER [r˜e | s˜ = s]
γVarR [r˜e | s˜ = s] . (35)
The optimal portfolio for an MEU investor with risk aversion γ and ambiguity aversion
34Koijen and Nieuwerburgh (2011) consider 84 annual observations to study the predictability of
the price-dividend ratio for stock market returns and dividend growth. The R2s of return predictabil-
ity regressions with signiﬁcant price-dividend ratio range from 4.82% to 17.72% and the R2s of cash
ﬂow predictability regressions with signiﬁcant price-dividend ratio range from 4.08% to 24.42%.
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[Ra, Rb] is
θ(s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
θ¯(s, Ra) s ≥ s1 ≡ −Ramax(λe, 0)− 1Ra min(λe, 0)
max
(
θ¯(s, 0), 0
)
s1 > s ≥ s2 ≡ −Rb max(λe, 0)− 1Rb min(λe, 0)
θ¯(s, Rb) s2 > s ≥ s3 ≡ − 1Rb max(λe, 0)− Rbmin(λ, 0)
min
(
θ¯(s, 0), 0
)
s3 > s ≥ s4 ≡ − 1Ra max(λe, 0)− Ramin(λe, 0)
θ¯(s, Ra) s < s4,
where λe =
μe
σe
denotes the unconditional Sharpe ratio.
We know from Section II that there is range of good and bad signals for which
investors neither buy nor sell short the asset (information inertia of the risk-free
portfolio). Moreover, if the unconditional Sharpe ratio is positive (λe > 0), then
there is a range of bad signals for which investors do not change their long position
and if the unconditional Sharpe ratio is negative (λe < 0), then there is range of good
signals for which investors do not change their short position (information inertia for
risky portfolios). The size of the inaction region and the probability of information
inertia is given in Proposition 8 in Appendix A.
Table 1 shows the probability of information inertia conditional on bad news for
risky portfolios (Risky PF), for the riskfree portfolio (Risk-free PF), and for both
(Total).35 We consider ﬁve diﬀerent values for the unconditional Sharpe ratio, that
is, λe ∈ {0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4, 0.5} and ambiguity aversion decreases from α = 0.99 to
α = 0.5. From Panel B of the Table in which α = 0.95, we see that for an asset
with unconditional Sharpe ratio of 0.3, the conditional probability of information
inertia for a risky portfolio is 9.3% when the R2 is 0.09 and 8.6% when the R2 is
0.16. The total probability of information inertia conditional on a bad news surprise
is 62.7% and 54.3%, respectively. The probability of information inertia for risky
portfolios is increasing in the unconditional Sharpe ratio and decreasing in the R2 of
the predictability regression. The probability of information inertia for the risk free
portfolio is increasing in ambiguity aversion and non-monotonic in the unconditional
35The unconditional probability is half of the conditional probability.
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Sharpe ratio and the R2 of the predictability regression.
B Information Inertia of Prices
Suppose the signal s˜ predicts future dividend growth r˜e, that is, y˜ = g˜d, y¯ = μg,
and σy = σg in equation (31). The equilibrium expected excess return with an
SEU-RI who has mean-variance preferences and belief R is constant and equal to
μ¯e ≡ γσ2g(1 − R2). This is no longer true when there is ambiguity aversion about
R. Speciﬁcally, the equilibrium expected excess return with an MEU-RI who has
mean-variance preferences and ambiguity aversion [Ra, Rb] is
μe(s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
γσ2g(1− R2a) if s > −γRaσg
γσ2g if −γRbσg ≤ s ≤ −γRaσg
γσ2g(1− R2b) if s < −γRbσg.
(36)
There is a range of signals for which the information does not get incorporated into the
price and thus the expected excess return in equilibrium is equal to the unconditional
expected excess return γσ2g . The size of the inaction region and the probability of
information inertia is given in Proposition 9 in Appendix A.
We report the probability of information inertia in prices conditional on bad
news in Table 2.36 We consider six diﬀerent values for the unconditional expected
excess return, that is, γσ2g ∈ {0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.075, 0.1} and ambiguity aversion
decrease from α = 0.99 to α = 0.5. Panel B of Table 2 shows that for α = 0.95
and an unconditional expected excess return of 10%, the conditional probability of
information inertia is 29.8% when the R2 is 9% and 26.7% when the R2 is 16%. The
probability of information inertia is increasing in the unconditional expected excess
return and decreasing in the R2 of the predictability regression.
36The unconditional probability is half of the conditional probability.
32
Table 1: Information Inertia of Optimal Portfolios
This table shows the probability of information inertia conditional on a bad news
surprise for diﬀerent ambiguity aversion (α), explanatory power of the excess return
predictability regressions (R2), and unconditional Sharpe ratios (λe). The size of the
data sample is ﬁxed at T = 84. The probability of information inertia for a long posi-
tion is decreasing in the R2 and increasing in λe and α. The probability of information
inertia for the risk free portfolio is increasing in α and non monotonic in λe and the R
2.
R2 = 9% R2 = 16% R2 = 25%
Sharpe
Ratio
Risky
PF
Riskfree
PF
Total Risky
PF
Riskfree
PF
Total Risky
PF
Riskfree
PF
Total
Panel A (α = 0.99)
0.25 10.16% 63.97% 74.12% 9.41% 61.50% 70.91% 8.44% 38.35% 46.79%
0.3 12.17% 57.43% 69.60% 11.27% 59.51% 70.78% 10.10% 41.72% 51.82%
0.35 14.18% 51.22% 65.39% 13.11% 55.61% 68.72% 11.73% 43.50% 55.23%
0.4 16.17% 45.38% 61.55% 14.94% 50.90% 65.84% 13.35% 43.85% 57.20%
0.5 20.12% 34.91% 55.03% 18.54% 41.26% 59.80% 16.51% 41.25% 57.76%
Panel B (α = 0.95)
0.25 7.79% 59.87% 67.66% 7.20% 44.05% 51.25% 6.44% 26.39% 32.83%
0.3 9.34% 53.37% 62.71% 8.62% 45.65% 54.28% 7.70% 29.36% 37.07%
0.35 10.88% 46.88% 57.76% 10.04% 45.15% 55.19% 8.95% 31.36% 40.31%
0.4 12.41% 40.79% 53.20% 11.44% 43.08% 54.52% 10.19% 32.42% 42.60%
0.5 15.45% 30.09% 45.54% 14.19% 36.31% 50.51% 12.59% 32.03% 44.63%
Panel C (α = 0.9)
0.25 6.56% 53.62% 60.18% 6.06% 35.42% 41.48% 5.41% 21.26% 26.67%
0.3 7.86% 49.33% 57.19% 7.25% 37.53% 44.79% 6.47% 23.82% 30.29%
0.35 9.16% 43.73% 52.89% 8.44% 37.95% 46.39% 7.52% 25.64% 33.16%
0.4 10.45% 37.89% 48.34% 9.62% 36.96% 46.58% 8.56% 26.73% 35.29%
0.5 13.01% 27.28% 40.29% 11.94% 32.15% 44.09% 10.58% 26.90% 37.47%
Panel D (α = 0.75)
0.25 4.61% 37.92% 42.53% 4.25% 23.37% 27.62% 3.79% 14.15% 17.94%
0.3 5.52% 37.08% 42.61% 5.09% 25.31% 30.40% 4.53% 15.97% 20.50%
0.35 6.43% 34.35% 40.78% 5.92% 26.19% 32.11% 5.27% 17.34% 22.61%
0.4 7.34% 30.49% 37.83% 6.75% 26.11% 32.86% 5.99% 18.24% 24.23%
0.5 9.14% 21.89% 31.03% 8.37% 23.69% 32.06% 7.41% 18.72% 26.13%
Panel E (α = 0.5)
0.25 2.71% 21.74% 24.45% 2.50% 13.18% 15.68% 2.22% 8.04% 10.27%
0.3 3.25% 22.03% 25.28% 2.99% 14.44% 17.43% 2.66% 9.12% 11.78%
0.35 3.78% 21.10% 24.88% 3.48% 15.13% 18.61% 3.09% 9.94% 13.04%
0.4 4.32% 19.27% 23.59% 3.96% 15.28% 19.24% 3.52% 10.52% 14.03%
0.5 5.37% 14.26% 19.63% 4.92% 14.23% 19.15% 4.35% 10.92% 15.26%
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Table 2: Information Inertia of Prices
This table shows the probability of information inertia in equilibrium prices condi-
tional on a bad news surprise for diﬀerent ambiguity aversion (α), explanatory power
of the cash ﬂow predictability regressions (R2), and unconditional expected excess
return (γσ2g). The size of the data sample is ﬁxed at T = 84. The probability of
information inertia is decreasing in the R2 and increasing in γσ2g and α.
Unconditional Expected Excess Return
2% 3% 4% 5% 7.5% 10%
R2 Panel A (α = 0.99)
9% 8.13% 12.17% 16.17% 20.12% 29.73% 38.81%
16% 7.54% 11.27% 14.94% 18.54% 27.14% 34.99%
25% 6.77% 10.10% 13.35% 16.51% 23.88% 30.27%
R2 Panel B (α = 0.95)
9% 6.24% 9.34% 12.41% 15.45% 22.83% 29.82%
16% 5.77% 8.62% 11.44% 14.19% 20.77% 26.76%
25% 5.17% 7.70% 10.19% 12.59% 18.20% 23.03%
R2 Panel C (α = 0.9)
9% 5.26% 7.86% 10.45% 13.01% 19.23% 25.13%
16% 4.86% 7.25% 9.62% 11.94% 17.47% 22.51%
25% 4.34% 6.47% 8.56% 10.58% 15.28% 19.32%
R2 Panel D (α = 0.75)
9% 3.69% 5.52% 7.34% 9.14% 13.51% 17.66%
16% 3.41% 5.09% 6.75% 8.37% 12.25% 15.78%
25% 3.04% 4.53% 5.99% 7.41% 10.69% 13.51%
R2 Panel E (α = 0.5)
9% 2.17% 3.25% 4.32% 5.37% 7.95% 10.39%
16% 2.00% 2.99% 3.96% 4.92% 7.20% 9.27%
25% 1.78% 2.66% 3.52% 4.35% 6.27% 7.92%
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VI Conclusion
We study how information about an asset aﬀects optimal portfolios when investors
do not know the model that links this information to future asset values. We show
that ambiguity averse investors do not always act on information that is worse than
expected. Hence, they do not participate in the stock market or rebalance their port-
folios as frequently as traditional models would predict which is consistent with the
household portfolio choice literature.37 Our explanation does not rely on information
processing costs or other market frictions and it is diﬀerent from the explanation in
Epstein and Schneider (2010) and Illeditsch (2011) who show that aversion to ambi-
guity leads to risk-free and risky portfolios that do not react to changes in the stock
price—a phenomenon which they refer to as portfolio inertia.
We also study the eﬀects of ambiguity aversion on the equilibrium price of the
market portfolio when investors receive information about its future cash ﬂows. We
show that the price of the market portfolio fails to incorporate all available informa-
tion in equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, signals that convey information that is better than
expected are always reﬂected in the stock price while some signals that convey infor-
mation that is worse than expected are not. This informational ineﬃciency leads to
price underreaction consistent with momentum.
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A Appendix: Proofs and Additional Results
We ﬁrst state and prove two results that are of independent interest and will also
be useful in proofs of the main results. The ﬁrst result (Proposition 7) determines
the certainty equivalent of the MEU investor and the second result (Theorem 3)
determines the MEU optimal portfolio as a function of price.
Proposition 7 (Preferences). Let θˆa ≡ −s/(γRaσd) and θˆb ≡ −s/(γRbσd). The cer-
tainty equivalent of an investor with risk aversion γ and ambiguity aversion described
by [Ra, Rb] who has recieved signal s is
CE(θ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ERa [w˜ | s˜ = s]− 12γVarRa [w˜ | s˜ = s] if θ ≤ min
(
θˆa, 0
)
E [w˜]− 1
2
γVar [w˜]− s2
2γ
if min
(
θˆa, 0
)
< θ ≤ min
(
θˆb, 0
)
ERb [w˜ | s˜ = s]− 12γVarRb [w˜ | s˜ = s] if min
(
θˆb, 0
)
< θ ≤ max
(
θˆb, 0
)
E [w˜]− 1
2
γVar [w˜]− s2
2γ
if max
(
θˆb, 0
)
< θ ≤ max
(
θˆa, 0
)
ERa [w˜ | s˜ = s]− 12γVarRa [w˜ | s˜ = s] if θ > max
(
θˆa, 0
)
.
(37)
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The certainty equivalent CE(θ) is a continuous and concave function of the stock
demand θ. Moreover, it is continuously diﬀerentiable except for the portfolio θ = 0 if
s 
= 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. The certainty equivalent CE(θ) of the ambiguity averse MEU
investor satisﬁes
CE(θ) = min
R∈[Ra,Rb]
CE(θ, R). (38)
Note that
∂CE(θ, R)
∂R
= θσds+ γθ
2σ2dR. (39)
Consider three cases, (i) s = 0, (ii) s > 0, and (iii) s < 0.
(i) s = 0 ⇔ θˆa = θˆb = 0.
Then ∂CE(θ,R)
∂R
> 0 for all R ∈ [Ra, Rb]. Thus the minimum of CE(θ, R) is
attained at Ra and hence,
CE(θ) = min
R∈[Ra,Rb]
CE(θ, R) = CE(θ, Ra) for all θ ∈ R. (40)
CE(θ, Ra) is continuously diﬀerentiable and concave in θ for all θ ∈ R and thus
so is CE(θ).
(ii) s > 0 ⇔ θˆa < θˆb < 0.
Suppose θ < θˆa < 0 or θ > 0. Then
∂CE(θ,R)
∂R
> 0 for all R ∈ [Ra, Rb]. Thus, the
minimum of CE(θ, R) is attained at Ra.
Suppose θˆb < θ < 0. Then
∂CE(θ,R)
∂R
< 0 for all R ∈ [Ra, Rb]. Thus, the minimum
of CE(θ, R) is attained at Rb.
Suppose θˆa ≤ θ ≤ θˆb. Then, since ∂2CE(θ,R)∂R2 > 0, the minimum is attained when
∂CE(θ,R)
∂R
= 0, i.e. R∗(θ) ≡ argmin
R∈[Ra,Rb]
CE(θ, R) = −s
γσdθ
. Note that R∗ ∈ [Ra, Rb]
when θˆa ≤ θ ≤ θˆb < 0 and that
CE(θ, R∗) = E[w˜]− 1
2
γVar[w˜]− s
2
2γ
= CE(θ, 0)− s
2
2γ
. (41)
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Using the above, we get
CE(θ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
CE(θ, Ra) if θ ≤ θˆa
CE(θ, 0)− s2
2γ
if θˆa < θ ≤ θˆb
CE(θ, Rb) if θˆb < θ ≤ 0
CE(θ, Ra) if 0 < θ.
(42)
as desired.
CE(θ) is continuous for all θ ∈ R and R ∈ [Ra, Rb] and CE(0, Ra) = CE(0, Rb).
CE(θ, R) is continuously diﬀerentiable for all θ ∈ R and R ∈ [Ra, Rb] and the
∂2CE(θ,R)
∂θ2
≤ 0 for all θ ∈ R and R ∈ [Ra, Rb]. Thus, for any θ 
= 0 there is
an open neighborhood for such CE(θ) is continuously diﬀerentiable and ∂
2CE(θ)
∂θ2
exists and is non-positive.
To verify concavity and non-diﬀerentiability of CE(θ) at θ = 0, we calculate the
left derivative CE′−(θ) and the right derivative CE′+(θ) at θ = 0.
CE′−(0) ≡ lim
θ↑0
∂CE(θ)
∂θ
= d¯+Rbσds− p (43)
CE′+(0) ≡ lim
θ↓0
∂CE(θ)
∂θ
= d¯+Raσds− p (44)
Thus, CE′−(0) > CE′+(0), so CE(θ) is concave for all θ ∈ R, not diﬀerentiable
at θ = 0, and continuously diﬀerentiable at all θ 
= 0.
(iii) s < 0 ⇔ θˆ > θˆb > 0.
Using reasoning similar to that for the above case, we get
CE(θ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
CE(θ, Ra) if θ ≤ 0
CE(θ, Rb) if 0 < θ ≤ θˆb
CE(θ, 0)− s2
2γ
if θˆb < θ ≤ θˆa
CE(θ, Ra) if θˆa < θ
(45)
and that CE(θ) is continuous and concave in θ ∈ R. Moreover, CE(θ) is con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable at all θ 
= 0.
Finally, combining the above cases provides the desired expression and properties
for CE(θ).
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Theorem 3 (Optimal Demand). Optimal demand at price p for an investor with risk
aversion γ and ambiguity aversion described by [Ra, Rb] who has recieved signal s is
θ(s, p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
θ(s, Ra, p) p ≤ p1(s) ≡ μ(s, Ra)− γσ2(Ra)max
(
θˆa, 0
)
max
(
θ(s, 0, p), 0
)
p1(s) < p ≤ p2(s) ≡ μ(s, Rb)− γσ2(Rb)max
(
θˆb, 0
)
θ(s, Rb, p) p2(s) < p ≤ p3(s) ≡ μ(s, Rb)− γσ2(Rb)min
(
θˆb, 0
)
min
(
θ(s, 0, p), 0
)
p3(s) < p ≤ p4(s) ≡ μRa(s)− γσ2(Ra)min
(
θˆa, 0
)
θ(s, Ra, p) p > p4(s),
(46)
where μ(s, R) = d¯+Rσds and σ
2(R) ≡ σ2d(1− R2).
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider three cases: (i) s = 0, (ii) s > 0, and s < 0. For
expositional simplicity, we make the dependence on p and s explicit.
(i) s = 0 ⇔ θˆa = θˆb = 0, so it follows from the proof of Proposition 7 that
CE(θ) = CE(θ, Ra) for all θ ∈ R. Thus, it follows that θ(s, p) = θ(s, Ra, p) for
all p ∈ R.
(ii) s > 0 ⇔ θˆa < θˆb < 0, so it follows from the proof of Proposition 7 that CE(θ)
is given by (42).
Consider ﬁve sub-cases: (a) p ≤ p1 = μ(s, Ra), (b) p1 < p ≤ p2 = μ(s, Rb), (c)
p2 < p ≤ p3 = μ(s, Rb) − γσ2(Rb)θˆb, (d) p3 < p ≤ p4 = μ(s, Ra) − γσ2(Ra)θˆa,
and (e) p4 < p.
(ii)(a) Suppose p ≤ p1. We show that θ(s, p) = θ(s, Ra, p). First, note that
θ(s, Ra, p) =
μ(s, Ra)− p
γσ2(Ra)
≥ μ(s, Ra)− p1
γσ2(Ra)
= 0. (47)
Moreover, for any θ > 0, CE(θ) = CE(θ, Ra) from (42). Thus, since CE(θ)
is concave, θ(s, Ra, p) is the local and hence global maximizer of CE(θ) for
all p ≤ p1.
(ii)(b) Suppose p1 < p ≤ p2. We show that θ(s, p) = 0. First, note that since
Raσd > 0,
θ(s, 0, p) =
d¯− p
γσ2d
<
d¯− p1
γσ2d
≤ μ(s, Ra)− p1
γσ2d
= 0. (48)
Since CE(θ) is concave, it suﬃces to show that θ = 0 is a local maximizer.
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Given (42), there exists  > 0 such that
CE(θ) =
⎧⎨
⎩CE(θ, Rb) if −  < θ ≤ 0CE(θ, Ra) if 0 ≤ θ < . (49)
For − < θ ≤ 0,
CE(0)− CE(θ, Rb) = θ
(
p− d¯−Rbσds
)
+
1
2
γ(σ2d(1− R2b)) ≥ 0 (50)
when p ≤ p2.
For 0 ≤ θ < ,
CE(0)− CE(θ, Ra) = θ
(
p− d¯− Raσds
)
+
1
2
γ(σ2d(1− R2a)) ≥ 0 (51)
when p1 ≤ p. Combining the above, shows that θ = 0 is a local and hence
global maximizer of CE(θ) for p1 < p ≤ p2.
(ii)(c) Suppose p2 < p ≤ p3. We show that θ(s, p) = θ(s, Rb, p). First, note that
θ(s, Rb, p) =
μ(s, Rb)− p
γσ2(Rb)
<
μ(s, Rb)− p2
γσ2(Rb)
= 0 (52)
when p2 < p and that
θ(s, Rb, p) =
μ(s, Rb)− p
γσ2(Rb)
≥ μ(s, Rb)− p3
γσ2(Rb)
= θˆb (53)
when p ≤ p3.
From (42), CE(θ) = CE(θ, Rb) when θˆb < θ ≤ 0. Thus, given concavity
of CE(θ), θ(s, Rb, p) is a local and hence global maximizer of CE(θ) when
p2 < p ≤ p3.
(ii)(d) Suppose p3 < p ≤ p4. We show that θ(s, p) = θ(s, 0, p). First, note that
since Raσd > 0,
θ(s, 0, p) =
d¯− p
γσ2d
<
d¯− p3
γσ2d
<
d¯− p2
γσ2d
≤ 0. (54)
Also, p3 = μ(s, Rb)−γσ2(Rb)θˆb = d¯−γσ2d θˆb and p4 = μ(s, Ra)−γσ2(Ra)θˆa =
d¯− γσ2dθˆa. Hence,
θˆa ≤ θ(s, 0) < θˆb (55)
when p3 < p ≤ p4.
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From (42), CE(θ) = CE(θ, 0) − s2
2γ
when θˆa < θ ≤ θˆb < 0. Thus, since
CE(θ) is concave, θ(s, 0, p) is a local and hence global maximizer of CE(θ)
for p3 < p ≤ p4.
(ii)(e) Suppose p4 < p. We show that θ(s, p) = θ(s, Ra, p). First, note that
θ(s, Ra, p) =
μ(s, Ra)− p
γσ2(Ra)
<
μ(s, Ra)− p4
γσ2(Ra)
≤ θˆa = 0. (56)
Moreover, for any θ < θˆa, CE(θ) = CE(θ, Ra) from (42). Thus, since CE(θ)
is concave, θ(s, Ra, p) is the local and hence global maximizer of CE(θ) for
all p > p4.
Using the above, we get
θ(s, p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
θ(s, Ra, p) if p ≤ p1
0 if p1 < p ≤ p2
θ(s, Rb, p) if p2 < p ≤ p3
θ(s, 0, p) if p3 < p ≤ p4
θ(s, Ra, p) if p4 < p.
(57)
as desired.
(iii) When s < 0 ⇔ θˆa > θˆb > 0, then it follows from the proof of Proposition
7 that CE(θ) is given by (45). Moreover, p1 = μ(s, Ra) − γσ2(Ra)θˆa, p2 =
μ(s, Rb)− γσ2(Rb)θˆb, p3 = μ(s, Rb), and (d) p4 = μ(s, Ra). Thus, using similar
reasoning as above, we get
θ(s, p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
θ(s, Ra, p) if p ≤ p1
θ(s, 0, p) if p1 < p ≤ p2
θ(s, Rb, p) if p2 < p ≤ p3
0 if p3 < p ≤ p4
θ(s, Ra, p) if p4 < p.
(58)
as desired.
Combining the three cases above provides the desired expression for θ(s).
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider three cases: (i) λ = 0, (ii) λ > 0, and (iii) λ < 0
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and the expression for demand in Theorem 3. We omit the dependence on p for
expositional ease.
(i) Suppose λ = 0. Then s1 = s2 = s3 = s4 = 0 and from Theorem 3, θ(s) =
θ(s, Ra) if p ≤ p1 ⇔ s ≥ 0 and if p > p4 ⇔ s < 0.
(ii) λ > 0. Then s1 = −Raλ > s2 = −Rbλ > s3 = − λRb > s4 = − λRa .
Then from Theorem 3 the following holds.
θ(s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
θ(s, Ra) if p ≤ p1 ⇔ s ≥ s1
θ(s, 0) if p1 < p ≤ p2 ⇔ s1 > s ≥ s2
θ(s, Rb) if p2 < p ≤ p3 ⇔ s2 > s ≥ s3
0 if p3 < p ≤ p4 ⇔ s4 ≤ s < s3
θ(s, Ra) if p > p4 ⇔ s < s4.
(59)
(iii) λ < 0. Then s1 = − λRa > s2 = − λRb > s3 = −Rbλ > s4 = −Raλ.
Then from Theorem 3 the following holds.
θ(s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
θ(s, Ra) if p ≤ p1 ⇔ s ≥ s1
0 if p1 < p ≤ p2 ⇔ s1 > s ≥ s2
θ(s, Rb) if p2 < p ≤ p3 ⇔ s2 > s ≥ s3
θ(s, 0) if p3 < p ≤ p4 ⇔ s4 ≤ s < s3
θ(s, Ra) if p > p4 ⇔ s < s4.
(60)
Combining the above cases provides the desired expression.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose λ > 0. Then optimal demand for the MEU investor
is given by (59). Moreover, from the proof of Proposition 7 it follows that
R∗(s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Ra if s > s1 = −Raλ or s ≤ s4 = − λRa
− s
λ
if − λRb < s ≤ −Raλ
Rb if s ≤ s2 = −Rbλ or s > s3 = − λRb
(61)
Hence, it follows that
θ(s) =
⎧⎨
⎩θ(s, R
∗(s)) if s > − λ
Rb
or s < − λ
Ra
0 if − λ
Ra
≤ s ≤ − λ
Rb
.
(62)
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Proof of Proposition 2. Let s > − λ
Rb
. Then, s > − λ
R
for all R ∈ [Ra, Rb] since − λR is
increasing in R. From this it follows that for all R ∈ [Ra, Rb], d¯+Rσds−pσ(R) = λ(s, R) > 0
and hence θ(s, R) = λ(s,R)
γσ(R)
> 0.
Moreover, d
2
dR2
λ(s, R) > 0 for all R ∈ [Ra, Rb], so λ(s, R) is strictly convex in
R. Letting R′ denote the unique minimizer of λ(s, R) over [Ra, Rb], the ﬁrst-order
(Kuhn-Tucker) condition for the constrained minimisation yields
0 ≤ s+ λR
′
(1−R′2) (63)
with equality holding if Ra < R
′ < Rb. This yields the result that R∗(s) as in (61) is
unique minimizer of λ(s, R) over [Ra, Rb].
An analogous argument shows that if s < − λ
Ra
, then for allR ∈ [Ra, Rb], λ(s, R) <
0 and hence θ(s, R) < 0. Moreover, in this case, d
2
dR2
λ(s, R) < 0 for all R ∈ [Ra, Rb],
so λ(s, R) is strictly concave in R and the ﬁrst order condition yields the result that
R∗(s) = Ra is the unique maximizer of λ(s, R) over [Ra, Rb].
Proof of Proposition 3. Using θh(s, p) to denote the demand at price p for investor h
who recieves signal s, it follows from Theorem 3 that
θh(s, p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
μ(s,Ra)−p
γhσ2(Ra)
p ≤ p1
max
(
d¯−p
γhσ
2
d
, 0
)
p1 < p ≤ p2
μ(s,Rb)−p
γhσ2(Rb)
p2 < p ≤ p3
min
(
d¯−p
γhσ
2
d
, 0
)
p3 < p ≤ p4
μ(s,Ra)−p
γhσ2(Ra)
p > p4,
(64)
where p1, p2, p3, p4 are as in 3 due to homogeneous ambiguity aversion [Ra, Rb] across
investors.
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Summing up individual demands leads to aggregate demand,
θ(s, p) =
H∑
h=1
θh(s, p)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
μ(s,Ra)−p
γσ2(Ra)
p ≤ p1
max
(
d¯−p
γσ2d
, 0
)
p1 < p ≤ p2
μ(s,Rb)−p
γσ2(Rb)
p2 < p ≤ p3
min
(
d¯−p
γhσ
2
d
, 0
)
p3 < p ≤ p4
μ(s,Ra)−p
γσ2(Ra)
p > p4,
(65)
with 1
γ
=
∑H
h=1
1
γh
risk tolerance, wealth w0 =
∑H
h=1w0h and ambiguity aversion
described by [Ra, Rb].
The representative investor holds the risky asset in equilibrium and consumes the
dividend. Thus, using (5) and (6) and Proposition 1 with θ(s, p) = 1 for the RI yields
(16) as the representative investor utility in equilibrium. Since u′ > 0, the equilibrium
utility can be computed by solving
min
R∈[Ra,Rb]
μ(s, R)− 1
2
γσ2(R). (66)
Since μ(s, R)− 1
2
γσ2(R) is strictly convex in R over [Ra, Rb], the following ﬁrst order
(Kuhn-Tucker) condition is necessary and suﬃcient for the solution to the constrained
minimization problem.
0 ≤ R(s+ σsγ) (67)
with equality if R ∈ (Ra, Rb). Solving this yields (17) as desired.
Proof of Theorem 2. We make the dependence of demand on price p explicit for ex-
positional ease. Market clearing requires that θ(s, p) = 1 since there is one unit of
the risky asset in aggregate.
Consider three cases: (i) s > −γRaσd, (ii) −γRbσd ≤ s ≤ −γRaσd, and (iii)
s < −γRbσd.
(i) Suppose s > −γRaσd. Then θˆa < 1. We need to verify that markets clear when
p(s) = μ(s, Ra)− γσ2(Ra). From Theorem 1, it follows that
θ(s, p) = θ(s, Ra, p) =
μ(s, Ra)− p(s)
γσ2(Ra)
= 1 (68)
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if and only if
p(s) = μ(s, Ra)− γσ2(Ra) ≤ p1 = μ(s, Ra)− γσ2(Ra)max
{
θˆa, 0
}
(69)
or
p(s) = μ(s, Ra)− γσ2(Ra) > p4 = μ(s, Ra)− γσ2(Ra)min
{
θˆa, 0
}
. (70)
Since θˆa < 1, p(s) ≤ p1 and the result follows.
(ii) Suppose −γRbσd ≤ s ≤ −γRaσd. Then θˆb ≤ 1 ≤ θˆa. We need to verify that
markets clear when p(s) = d¯− γσ2d. From Theorem 1, it follows that
θ(s, p) = θ(s, 0, p) =
d¯− p(s)
γσ2d
= 1 (71)
if and only if
p(s) = d¯− γσ2d > p1 = μ(s, Ra)− γσ2(Ra)max
{
θˆa, 0
}
(72)
and
p(s) = d¯− γσ2d ≤ p2 = μ(s, Rb)− γσ2(Rb)max
{
θˆb, 0
}
. (73)
Since θˆa ≥ 1 and μ(s, Ra)− γσ2(Ra)θˆa = d¯− γσ2d θˆa, we have p(s) > p1.
If θˆb ≤ 0, then s ≥ 0. So, p(s) = d¯−γσ2d ≤ d¯+Rbσds = μ(s, Rb) = p2. If 0 < θˆb,
then since θˆb ≤ 1 we p(s) = d¯ − γσ2d ≤ d¯ − γσ2d θˆb = μ(s, Rb)− γσ2(Rb)θˆb = p2.
So, p1 < p(s) ≤ p2
(iii) Suppose s < −γRbσd. Then θˆb > 1. We need to verify that markets clear when
p(s) = μ(s, Rb)− γσ2(Rb). From Theorem 1, it follows that
θ(s, p) = θ(s, Rb, p) =
μ(s, Rb)− p(s)
γσ2(Rb)
= 1 (74)
if and only if
p(s) = μ(s, Rb)− γσ2(Rb) > p2 = μ(s, Rb)− γσ2(Rb)max
{
θˆb, 0
}
(75)
and
p(s) = μ(s, Rb)− γσ2(Rb) ≤ p3 = μ(s, Rb)− γσ2(Rb)min
{
θˆb, 0
}
. (76)
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Since θˆb > 1, p2 < p(s) ≤ p3 and the result follows.
Combining the above cases provides the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 4. Using θh(s) to denote the demand for investor h, it follows
from Theorem 3 that
θh(s, p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
μ(s,Rah)−p
γhσ2(Rah)
p ≤ p1h ≡ μ(s, Rah)− γhσ2(Rah)max
(
θˆah, 0
)
max
(
d¯−p
γhσ
2
d
, 0
)
p1h < p ≤ p2h ≡ μ(s, Rbh)− γhσ2(Rbh)max
(
θˆbh, 0
)
μbh−p
γhσ2(Rbh)
p2h < p ≤ p3h ≡ μ(s, Rbh)− γhσ2(Rbh)min
(
θˆbh, 0
)
min
(
d¯−p
γhσ
2
d
, 0
)
p3h < p ≤ p4h ≡ μ(s, Rah)− γhσ2(Rah)min
(
θˆbh, 0
)
μ(s,Rah)−p
γhσ2(Rah)
p > p4h,
(77)
where θˆah ≡ −s/(γhRahσd) and θˆbh ≡ −s/(γhRbhσd).
We ﬁrst show that there exists an equilibrium. Individual demand given in
equation (77) is continuous and non-increasing in p with lim
p→−∞
θh(s, p) = ∞ and
lim
p→∞
θh(s, p) = −∞ for all h ∈ {1, . . . , H}. Hence, aggregate demand θ(s, p) =∑H
h=1 θh(s, p) is continuous and non-increasing in p with limp→−∞
θ(s, p) = ∞ and
lim
p→∞
θ(s, p) = −∞. Hence, there exists an equilibrium because the market clear-
ing condition θ(s, p)− 1 = 0 has always a solution.
We next determine the equilibrium stock price p(s) for all s ∈ [−γσdRb,−γσdRa].
By assumption we have that Ra = max {Ra1, . . . , Rah} and Rb = min {Rb1, . . . , Rbh}.
Hence, since s < 0,
p1(s) ≡ max
h∈{1,...,H}
p1h(s) = max
h∈{1,...,H}
{
d¯+
σd
Rah
s
}
= d¯+
σd
Ra
s (78)
p2(s) ≡ min
h∈{1,...,H}
p2h(s) = min
h∈{1,...,H}
{
d¯+
σd
Rbh
s
}
= d¯+
σd
Rb
s. (79)
We have that Rb ≥ Ra and thus (i) [sˆb, sˆa] 
= ∅ and (ii) p2(s) ≥ p1(s) for all s ∈ [sˆb, sˆa].
It follows from equations (77)-(79) that
θh(s, p) =
d¯− p
γhσ2d
∀ p1(s) ≤ p ≤ p2(s), and ∀h ∈ {1, . . . , H}. (80)
Summing over all investors leads to
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θ(s, p) =
H∑
h=1
θh(s, p) =
d¯− p
σ2d
H∑
h=1
1
γh
=
d¯− p
γσ2d
∀ p1(s) ≤ p ≤ p2(s).
Imposing the market clearing condition θ(s, p)=1 leads to the price p(s) = d¯−γσ2d.
Finally, the desired result follows from noting that p1(s) ≤ d¯ − γσ2d ≤ p2(s) if and
only if −γσdRb ≤ s ≤ −γσdRa.
Proof of Proposition 5. For all θ ∈ R, the function ξ(θ, s, R),
ξ(θ, s, R) =
e−γ(1+α)(σdsR θ+
1
2
γσ2dR
2θ2)
EP
[
e−γ(1+α)(σdsR˜ θ+
1
2
γσ2dR˜
2θ2)
] (81)
is non-negative and EP
[
ξ(θ, s, R˜)
]
= 1 hence dQ (s, R, θ) as deﬁned in (25) is a
conditional probability distribution.
The utility U(θ) of a KMM investor from holding portfolio θ is as given in (24)
with u(w) = −e−γw, γ > 0 and φ(u) = − 1
1+α
(−u)1+α , α ≥ 0. The ﬁrst-order condi-
tion for this investor’s optimal portfolio is
0 = U ′(θ) = EP
[
φ′(u(CE(θ, R˜)))u′(CE(θ, R˜))
(
λ(s, R˜) + γθσ(R˜)
)
σ(R˜)
]
. (82)
The second derivative of (24) with respect to θ is
U ′′(θ) = EP
[(
λ(s, R˜) + γθσ(R˜)
)2
σ2(R˜) (φ′′(·)u′(·) + φ′(·)u′′(·))− φ′(·)u′(·)γσ2(R˜)
]
< 0
(83)
given u′ > 0, u′′ < 0 and φ′ > 0, φ′′ ≤ 0.
Hence, KMM investor utility is strictly concave in θ and optimal portfolio is
unique. Solving for θ(s) using the ﬁrst-order condition and φ′(u) = (−u)α and u′(w) =
γe−γw yields
θ(s) =
EP[φ′(·)u′(·)(λ(s,R˜)σ(R˜))]
γEP[σ2(R˜)]
=
(d¯−p)+σdsEQ(R;s,θ(s))[R˜|s˜=s]
γσ2d(1−EQ[(R˜2)])
= λ
Q(s,θ(s))
γσQ(s,θ(s))
(84)
as desired.
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Proof of Proposition 6. Setting θ(s) = 1 in (25) and usingQ(R, s) to denoteQ(R; s, 1)
yields the distribution of R˜ condtional on s˜ = s in (30).
The representative investor holds the risky asset and consumes the dividend in
equilibrium. Setting θ(s) = 1 in the ﬁrst-order condition (82) yields,
λQ(s,1) = γσQ (s, 1) . (85)
Using the expressions for λQ (s, θ(s)) and σQ (s, θ(s)) from Proposition 5 with θ(s) = 1
and Q(R, s) for Q(R; s, 1), solving for p(s) yields (29) as the unique equilibrium
price.
The following results provide the size and probability of information inertia in
portfolio choice (Proposition 8) and in equilibrium prices (Proposition 9) that are
used for the calculations in Section V.
Proposition 8. The size of the signal region for which risky portfolios do not react
to news is (Rb−Ra)λe. The probability of investors exhibiting information inertia for
risky asset positions conditional on s˜ ≤ x is
1
Φ (x)
·
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if x < −λeRb
Φ (λeRb)− Φ (−x) if −λeRb ≤ x ≤ −λeRa
Φ (λeRb)− Φ (λeRa) if x > −λeRa,
(86)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal dis-
tributed variable.
The size of the signal region for which the risk-free portfolio does not react to news
is Rb−Ra
RbRa
λe. The probability of investors exhibiting information inertia when holding
the risk-free portfolio conditional on s˜ ≤ x is
1
Φ (x)
·
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if x < − λe
Rb
Φ
(
λe
Rb
)
− Φ (−x) if − λe
Rb
≤ x ≤ − λe
Ra
Φ
(
λe
Ra
)
− Φ
(
λe
Rb
)
if x > − λe
Ra
.
(87)
Proof of Proposition 8. The expression for MEU investor optimal portfolio given in
sub-section A follows from reasoning similar to that for (8). That is, reasoning similar
to that for (59) (resp. (60)) in the proof of Theorem 1, yields that MEU investors are
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long (resp. short) in the stock, but demand does not react to news, i.e.
θ(s) = θ(s, 0) ≥ 0( resp. ≤ 0), (88)
if and only if λe > 0 (resp. λe < 0) and s1 > s ≥ s2, where s1 = −Raλe and
s2 = −Raλe (resp. s4 ≤ s < s3, where s4 = −Raλe and s3 = −Rbλe).
Hence, the size of the signal region for which risky portfolios do not react to news
is (Rb − Ra)λe. Moreover, s˜ ∼ N(0, 1), so it follows that the probability of investors
exhibiting information inertia for a risky asset position conditional on s˜ ≤ x is as
given in (86).
Moreover, reasoning similar to that for (59) (resp. (60)) in the proof of Theorem
1, yields that MEU investors hold the riskless portfolio, but demand does not react
to news, i.e.
θ(s) = 0, (89)
if and only if λe > 0 (resp. λe < 0) and s4 ≤ s < s3, where s4 = − λeRa and s3 = − λeRb
(resp. s1 > s ≥ s2, where s1 = − λeRa and s2 = − λeRa ).
Hence, the size of the signal region for which riskless portfolios does not react
to news Rb−Ra
RbRa
λe. Moreover, s˜ ∼ N(0, 1), so it follows that probability of investors
exhibiting information inertia for a risky asset position conditional on s˜ ≤ x is as
given in (87).
Proposition 9. The size of the signal region for which the stock price does not react to
news is γσg(Rb −Ra). The probability of the equilibrium price exhibiting information
inertia conditional on s˜ ≤ x
=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if x < −γRbσg
Φ(x)−Φ(−γRbσg)
Φ(x)
if −γRbσg ≤ x ≤ −γRaσg
Φ(−γRaσg)−Φ(−γRbσg)
Φ(x)
if x > −γRaσg,
(90)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal dis-
tributed variable.
Proof of Proposition 9. Since the representative investor holds the stock in equilibriun
(θ(s) = 1) and consumes the dividend, the expression for equilibrium expected excess
return is as given in (36) using reasoning similar to that for Proposition 3. It follows
that the size of the signal region for which the stock price does not react to news
is γσg(Rb − Ra). Moreover, s˜ ∼ N(0, 1), so the probability of the equilibrium price
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exhibiting information inertia conditional on s˜ ≤ x is as given in (90).
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